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ABSTRACT 
Current U.S. policy in the GWOT is predicated on an implicit assumption–that all 
societies share a universal preference ordering based on materialist concerns. 
This thesis examines and contrasts this “rational-materialist” approach to its main 
rival of “cultural determinism” and finds both to be lacking. By exploring two 
empirical cases—the U.S. Patriot movement, and Al Qaeda—I develop an 
alternative approach that highlights the previously neglected impact of ideology 
on such movements. The results of this inductive analysis are then used to 
generate specific policy implications for the U.S. 
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The agents pulled back the tarp to reveal the three armored personnel 
carriers with “FBI” painted in big white letters just enough to give the Montana 
Freeman a good look at them.1 It had been over a year since arrest warrants 
were issued for the group that barricaded themselves on the Clark ranch in 
eastern Montana in 1995. It was now the early summer of 1996. The Freeman, a 
subset of the Patriot movement, did not recognize the authority of the U.S. 
federal government and seemed willing to sacrifice their lives to prove that point. 
Tensions were high and negotiations had broken down several times over the 
course of the standoff that had started in the town of Roundup and ended up 120 
miles away in Jordan. Before it was over the U.S. federal government had 
allowed the Freeman to move uninhibited from one compound to another, flown 
Freeman members participating in the standoff to consult with members already 
in jail, and invited former fugitives of previous FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) standoffs to enter the Freeman compound to negotiate. These 
efforts only hinted at the significant change in strategy the FBI implemented 
against the Patriot movement in the mid 1990s. After the profound failures of the 
federal government at places like Ruby Ridge and Waco and the devastation of 
the recent bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, the U.S. 
federal government knew it had to make a significant change in its approach to 
this domestic unrest–what might even be argued to be a burgeoning insurgency. 
The arrival of the armored personnel carriers might have suggested to some that 
the lessons had not been learned, but they were wrong. Two weeks later the 
standoff with the Freeman was over without bloodshed, a marked departure from 
previous events.  
What caused this change in government behavior? I would argue that the 
key factor was that the FBI recognized that the enemy they faced were not mere 
                                            
1 David A. Neiwert, In God’s Country: The Patriot Movement and the Pacific Northwest 
(Pullman: The University of Washington Press, 1999), 254. 
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delinquents, but devotees to an ideological cause. In other words, the standard 
self-interested calculus of common criminals was absent. In its place was a 
collective worldview and group dynamic that drove the members of the Freeman 
to form beliefs, take actions, and bear burdens in a manner completely at odds 
with “normal” lawbreakers. This led government agencies to conclude that these 
actors would respond much differently to the application of force than the 
standard criminal. Ultimately, the FBI was successful against the Patriot 
movement for two reasons. First, the FBI recognized the role that ideology 
played in the behavior of these groups. Second, the FBI used that knowledge to 
inform how they would apply force against these groups. 
How would such a reconsideration of the role of ideology affect 
contemporary foreign policy in regards to the “global war on terror”? Currently, 
such a recognition is absent from the U.S. government, as another significant 
non-state threat presents itself in the form of violent Islamist groups, Al Qaeda 
being chief among them. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have 
rejected the idea that Islamic teaching encourages violence directed against 
Western society. The recent National Security Strategy of 2010 explicitly 
contends that any religion, including Islam, is inherently peaceful and cannot be 
considered a motivating factor for political violence.2 This is not surprising. 
Refusing to condemn an entire religion and the people who subscribe to that 
religion, seems to be a wise political move for at least two reasons. First, labeling 
all Muslims as the enemy potentially creates at least some enemies where there 
was none before. Second, and perhaps more important, doing so might appear 
to be in direct contradiction to our core values of religious freedom and tolerance. 
However, this politically amenable rhetoric can lead to ineffective or 
dangerous policy. The solution for the problem of terrorism, according to both 
administrations, does not lie in dealing with the cultural factors that motivate 
people to violence, but rather with the lack of economic and democratic 
                                            
2 Barak Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 22. 
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opportunity for the Muslim population writ large. This argument is based– 
explicitly or implicitly–in rational-materialist theory, which claims that all actors 
work to maximize their economic utility and which treats all people as essentially 
uniform in preferences.3 The question remains, however, if such an approach is 
fully adequate to explain the causes of political violence. If it is not, as will be 
argued, then pursuing a policy grounded only in rational-materialism is 
dangerously flawed.  
Addressing the cultural motivations for violence, however, may prove no 
less problematic than rational-materialist explanations. A “clash of civilizations” 
view of the world may prove to be adequate for describing a phenomenon, but 
may not lead to a useful general theory about the underlying causes of terrorism. 
To defeat terrorism encouraged by violent Islamism, the U.S. must first properly 
understand the threat. If rational-materialism and cultural determinism alone are 
inadequate to provide solutions, what can be done? By evaluating the U.S.’s 
treatment of a similar group, the Patriot movement, we can understand how the 
U.S. achieved success only after it accounted for the ideological motivations 
behind the movement, and then applied force appropriately. Applying force 
appropriately is key, as often it is the only method available that actually changes 
the minds of ideologues who tend to accept only facts that support for their 
worldview. Once an ideology is selected, there is no “going back” by applying 
rational-materialist based approaches. 
In this thesis, I will attempt to show that general theories about political 
violence are inadequate to form successful counterterrorism policy and that 
understanding ideological motivations is key to defeating violent Islamism. I will 
do this in five steps. First, I will outline the two prevalent explanations regarding 
the underlying causes of terrorism and show why each by itself is inadequate to 
fully explain causation. Second, I will demonstrate the similarities between the 
Patriot movement and violent Islamists and hold them as adequately similar to 
                                            
3 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory,” Business School Working 
Papers UHBS, Economics Paper 27 (2003–6), http://hdl.handle.net/2299/691, 2. 
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allow for generalizing among them. Third, I will present an examination of the 
U.S. government response to both groups, showing that the U.S. succeeded 
against the Patriot movement, yet fails with violent Islamists, due to a 
fundamental understanding of (or failure to understand) the role that ideology 
plays in motivating political violence. Fourth, I will explore how ideology motivates 
actors to political violence and explain why often only the appropriate application 
of force is the key to defeating ideologically driven movements. Lastly, I will 
include policy recommendations for the way ahead. 
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II. EXPLANATIONS FOR TERRORISM  
On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda conducted a spectacular coordinated 
attack against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C. Stunned by the attack, the U.S. launched the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT) by invading the operational headquarters of Al Qaeda in the 
Taliban controlled country of Afghanistan. Under the guise of the GWOT, the 
U.S. then followed up with a large-scale conventional invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq. Additionally, the U.S. launched smaller scale military 
operations as part of the GWOT in the Philippines, Horn of Africa, Yemen, and 
other locations in Muslim dominated countries. After nearly nine years of fighting, 
the threat from terrorism appears to loom as large as it did immediately after 
9/11. Although attacks of the magnitude of 9/11 have not been replicated, and 
many smaller attacks have proven unsuccessful, the frequency of attempted 
terror attacks against the U.S. has only increased.4 While the number of foiled 
terror operations seems to indicate that the American security apparatus has 
improved its ability to defend against such attacks, the increased frequency of 
these attacks raises questions as to the effectiveness of the U.S.’s strategy in 
dealing with the root causes of terrorism; those conditions that spawn political 
violence. Without an effective strategy that deals with the root causes of 
terrorism, it remains a matter of time before a major successful attack is carried 
out again.  
This chapter deals with the two predominate theories that attempt to 
explain the underlying causes of terrorism, not the techniques involved in 
defending against terror attacks. In describing these two approaches, I will use 
the terms rational-materialism and cultural determinism.5 In the first section of the 
                                            
4 Carol Cratty, “Document Says Number of Attempted Attacks on U.S. Is at All-Time High,” 
CNN.com, May 27, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/26/terrorism.document/index.html. 
5 Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” International Security 27, 
no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003): 6. 
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chapter, I will lay out both approaches. Next, I will examine how each proposition 
influences U.S. policy. Finally, I will assess the validity of current U.S. anti-terror 
strategy in light these findings. 
To begin, it is important to understand what is meant by “terrorism.” 
Definitions for terrorism vary but the common use of the term recognizes it 
having “four characteristics: a fundamentally political nature, the symbolic use of 
violence, purposeful targeting of noncombatants, carried out by non-state 
actors.”6 The last three characteristics simply reveal that terrorism is a strategy of 
the weak; that without the resources of the state, groups must resort to 
unconventional means to accomplish their goals.7 The first characteristic, that 
terrorism is fundamentally political in nature, highlights terrorisms’ raison d’être.8 
Terrorism, therefore, is a political activity. To say that terrorism is a political 
activity (a form of political violence) is not to say that the objective of terrorism is 
to establish democratic institutions. Rather, it is to say that terrorism is merely a 
tactic designed to bring about some change in the exercise of political power. 
This thesis, therefore, will use the terms “terrorism” and “political violence" to 
mean the same thing: the use of violence in an attempt to implement an 
alternative political reality. 
The rational-materialist approach to understanding terrorism claims that 
those involved in conducting terrorist attacks are rational actors making a 
deliberate strategic choice that attempts to achieve material gain through political 
                                            
6 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Terrorist Campaigns End,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind: 
Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 7. 
7 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International 
Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 50. 
8 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 52; Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of 
Suicide Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in Origins of Terrorism: 
Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990), 7; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The 
Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 
2000), 220.  
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or socio-economic progress.9 The solution to terrorism, therefore, is to provide 
economic opportunity to the disadvantaged populations where terrorists operate, 
establish democratic institutions, and promote education to eradicate ignorance 
among the masses of potential terrorists or terror supporters. This view holds that 
if people merely had the ability to obtain material means through legitimate and 
peaceful activities, they would have no reason to engage in political violence. 
Chief among those that support this view is the influential David Kilcullen who 
suggests that the GWOT should instead be viewed as “a campaign against a 
globalized Islamist insurgency.”10 To defeat this threat, Kilcullen argues for an 
updated approach to classical counterinsurgency involving a large-scale 
development program and “representative government.”11 It is argued that by 
addressing the grievances that fuel the insurgency, terrorism can be defeated. 
The Washington think tank the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), 
from which several employees have gone to serve in the Obama administration, 
echoes this sentiment. CNAS highlights the importance of “creating conditions 
hostile to extremists.”12 This explicitly means promoting economic opportunity 
and democratic institutions among Muslim populations in the Middle East and 
Western nations.13  
While all advocates are quick to point out that dealing with the supposed 
underlying causes of terrorism is not alone sufficient to defeat terrorism, it is not 
clear that this approach will work, even as a part of a larger anti-terror strategy. 
Consider evidence concerning the economic assumptions. Research by Alan B. 
Krueger and Jitka Maleckova indicates that even if there is a correlation between 
                                            
9 Crenshaw, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic 
Choice,” 7. 
10 David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, 
no. 4 (2005): 597. 
11 Ibid., 611. 
12 Kristen M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth D. Rosen, “Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy 
to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism,” Center for a New American Security Solarium Strategy 
Series, June 9, 2009, http://www.cnas.org/node/975, 16. 
13 Ibid., 17. 
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terrorism, income and education level, it actually may be positive.14 They also 
argue that economic incentives, such as foreign aid may actually incentivize 
terrorism.15 Other researchers echo concerns that economic development may 
increase the threat of political violence. Ethan B. Kapstein points out that 
economic assistance given to one side in a conflict may have a destabilizing 
effect due to perceived favoritism.16  
What about the assumption that democracy is the solution to quelling 
political violence? Michael Freeman has concluded that considering the actual 
grievances underlying Islamic jihad, democracy will be “ineffectual and possibly 
counterproductive.”17 In addition, F. Gregory Gause III shows that 
democratization is harmful in that it will “lead to Islamist domination of Arab 
politics,” which would certainly be hostile to U.S. interests.18 Finally, Audry Kurth 
Cronin points out that democracy and economic development may be 
destabilizing as they will create elevated and unrealistic expectations in the 
minds of the population.19 She concludes that, “the weight of the available 
evidence to date does not bear out the idealistic hopes of many in the West that 
democracy leads to a reduction in terrorism.”20  
In fact, the advocates themselves seem to understand this. The earlier 
mentioned CNAS report indicates twice the dubious link between terrorism, 
                                            
14 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?” The New 
Republic (June 24, 2002): 32. 
15 Ibid., 7. 
16 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Do Three Ds Make an F? The Limits of ‘Defense, Diplomacy, and 
Development,’” Prism 1, no. 3 (June 2010): 21. 
17 Freeman contends that the four major grievances that fuel the global jihad are perception 
of occupation, perceived threat to Islamic identity and culture from the West, the economic 
failures of modernization and the rule of illegitimate authoritarian regimes. Michael Freeman, 
“Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008): 53. 
18 F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 
8. 
19 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Sources of Contemporary Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: 
Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Kronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 25. 
20 Ibid., 34. 
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political oppression and poverty.21 So too, does Jennifer Windsor, who while 
advocating a democratization approach as part of an anti-terror strategy, plainly 
admits the direct link between democracy and terror does not exist.22 While 
terrorists are motivated by political objectives, clearly there is no evidence to 
suggest that democratization and economic development are viable parts of any 
comprehensive anti-terror solution. In other words, while actors who engage in 
terrorism and the populations that support them are likely affected by economic 
inequalities and are motivated by political aspirations, there is little evidence to 
suggest that democratic institutions or economic development will remove any 
incentive to engage in political violence. 
Given the overwhelming evidence that the rational model is severely 
problematic, why then is it such a popular argument? Five explanations are 
readily available. First, it seems that the popularity stems from cultural bias; the 
assumption that the rest of the world values freedom, democracy, economic 
opportunity and the values embedded in those ideals, to the same degree as 
Westerners. Carnes Lord perhaps explains this best when he says, “Americans 
tend to assume that concrete interests, such as economic well-being, personal 
freedom, and security of life and limb are the critical determinants of political 
behavior everywhere. It is an interesting irony that such a view is so prevalent in 
a country as fundamentally idealistic as the United States.”23 The curious use of 
the term “universal values” in the CNAS report exemplifies this dubious 
assumption.24  
                                            
21 Lord, Nagl, and Rosen, “Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist 
Extremism,” 17, 24. 
22 Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” The 
Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 44. 
23 Carnes Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” in Political Warfare and 
Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach, ed. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 22. 
24 Lord, Nagl, and Rosen, “Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist 
Extremism,” 22. 
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Second, while so many proponents are quick to point out that historical 
success of counterinsurgency campaigns involved these techniques (e.g., 
political accommodation and economic development), they fail to remember that 
forced relocations, torture, suspension of individual rights, and repression that 
often accompanies this method. It is quite likely that it was brutality that explained 
causation (i.e., changed the behavior of the actors), not economic development 
or political accommodation.25 Michael A. Cohen points out, “the methods for 
defeating an insurgency have generally been defined less by an open hand than 
a clenched fist.”26 From the American experience in the Philippines, the British 
involvement in Malaysia and Kenya, to the most recent example of the Sri Lanka 
government against the LTTE; coercion against the civilian population, not 
accommodation, often lead to the decline of the insurgency. Cohen reminds us 
that the great counter-insurgent figure David Galula taught that “fear–not hope–is 
generally the great motivator for civilian populations that find themselves caught 
in the crossfire.”27 
Third, rational-materialist arguments are easy to communicate. Viewing 
human behavior thorough the lens of a universally applied theory concerning 
material gain is a convenient way for laypeople to understand a particular 
phenomena. This proves especially true in Western culture. Robert P. Abelson 
explains: 
[rational materialistic] explanations are enjoy general public 
endorsement because they are more easily communicated, 
perhaps more readily learned in childhood, and more serviceable 
as handy public accounts of many behaviors–political and 




                                            
25 Anne Marlow, “What if Coin Doesn’t Work?” World Affairs, May 20, 2010, 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/marlowe. 




motivated (at least not as theorists model them). This is especially 
true in our culture, which applauds cleverly calculated action in the 
service of goal attainment.28 
Fourth, the rational-materialist approach may be the most politically 
feasible option for explaining to the American people and the world what the U.S. 
strategy will be. U.S. presidents, as leaders of democracies, must continually 
reconcile the political pressures of domestic audiences and the dynamics of the 
world community. Robert Putnam refers to this as the “two-level game.”29 While a 
cultural approach may incite more nationalistic passion from a domestic 
audience, it will most likely result in international scorn. As such, the rational-
materialistic approach may provide the best over-all strategy for the two games 
that American political leaders play. 
Finally, rational-materialist models do work in certain scenarios. 
Rationality theories originally found their usefulness in economics where 
behavior is subject to limited variables and where “information concerning quality 
and price are available and transparent and cost minimization dominates our 
concerns.”30 Over time, rational-materialism was applied to other disciplines, 
such as sociology, in an attempt to find a general theory that could explain all 
human behavior, not just economic decisions. The foundation of the rational-
materialist application that we are dealing with lies in research that shows that 
crime, specifically property crime, is accurately predicted by rates of poverty and 
lack of education.31 The rational-materialist approach in understanding property 
crime is useful, as the decision to engage in this type of crime closely matches a 
standard cost-benefit analysis where the actor is making an economic choice and 
is trying to maximize utility. Values, beliefs, and ideology are held constant and 
                                            
28 Robert P. Abelson, “The Secret Existence of Expressive Behavior,” in The Rational Choice 
Controversy, ed. Jeffrey Friedman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 31. 
29 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 434.  
30 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory,” Business School 
Working Papers UHBS, Economics Paper 27 (2003–6), http://hdl.handle.net/2299/691, 15. 
31 Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science 299, no. 5612 (March 2003): 1536. 
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universal preferences are assumed. Consider the inner city youth who is deciding 
how to obtain material goods for living. To meet his physical needs, his choices 
are to either engage in property crime or pursue higher education. Given the 
socio-economic barriers to higher education for this individual, he chooses 
property crime, which accords with the rational-materialist model. Unfortunately, 
it has become popular to apply this model broadly beyond its appropriate 
application. This model does not carry over to other types of human behavior 
(e.g., political violence). Why is this?  
Simply put, humans are not singularly focused on the pursuit of material 
gain. This seems a statement of the obvious, yet rational-materialistic 
explanations are predicated on this assumption. Consequently, when material 
concerns dominate, rational-materialism is sufficient to explain human behavior 
and useful for policy prescriptions. However, what is the result when material 
concerns fade from prominence? Rational-materialistic assumptions no longer 
apply and strategy derived from those assumptions is potentially ineffective at 
best and counter-productive at worst. There is a real danger here as Hodgson 
notes: 
The problem of such a theory [rational-materialist] is that, in its 
excessive quest for generality, it will fail to focus on the historically 
and geographically specific features of the socio-economic systems 
that we wish to study and understand. As long as social theory is 
confined to generalities it will remain highly limited in dealing with 
any specific socio-economic system, including the one in which we 
live.32 
Hence, so long as rational-materialist assumptions about the nature of 
political violence are held, a useful understanding of contemporary political 
violence seems out of reach. 
The second theory attempting to explain the causes of terrorism is cultural 
determinism. Here the values, beliefs, attitudes, goals, and behavior of groups of 
people determine when, where, and how conflict will occur. Foremost among the 
                                            
32 Hodgson, “On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory,” 16. 
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proponents of this view is Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington describes conflict in 
terms of the “clash of civilizations” where the West, no longer the dominating 
colonizing force it once was, will have to compete with non-Western societies.33 
Huntington’s broad analysis at the civilization level predicts the most virulent of 
these conflicts will be between Islamic (and Confucian) states and the West, and 
observes that Islam has “bloody borders.”34 Additionally, Mark Juergensmeyer 
introduces the concept of cosmic war, which is fueled more specifically by 
religious fervor, and refers to “metaphysical conflicts between good and evil.”35 
He observes, for example, that the “struggle that Bin Laden describes ultimately 
as not one of political and economic issues but between transcendent and 
worldly goals, a struggle between religion and anti-religion.”36 He notes that 
conflict can be characterized as cosmic war when it is seen to be in defense of 
“basic identity and dignity,” when losing would be intolerable, and when the fight 
cannot be won with human effort alone.37 Finally, Stephen Collins Coughlin 
argues that the motivating factor that drives radical Islamic jihadist is not poverty 
or repression, but Islamic law itself, which underpins jihadist militant doctrine.38 
He submits that America is in a war of ideas with Islam, yet fails to acknowledge 
it.  
The strength of the cultural model seems self-evident, particularly as it 
relates to Islam, as Huntington points out that conflict “occurs between Muslims, 
on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in 
India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines.”39 To that list, we can 
add more recent struggles in the Sahel, Indonesia and in Muslim enclaves in the 
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West. Jihadists’ own statements about their motivations and opinion polls of 
Muslim populations supportive of Al Qaeda’s goals reveal a cultural chasm that 
appears to fuel the flames of violence.40 
Unfortunately, this model is also severely problematic for three reasons. 
First, to explain terrorism or any form of political violence using culture, 
researchers have to account for variations in violence over time and space.41 Not 
all Muslim societies, for example, have been equally violent throughout the 
religion’s history and in all countries.42 Because of this variation, culture cannot 
be held as the causal variable in understanding political violence unless it is held 
as constant. When done so, however, empirical tests of culture are 
inconclusive.43 Culture does indeed change and various parts of cultures are 
more or less expressed in different ways at different times. Consider the 
difference in behavior between the Japanese citizens before and after WWII 
(imperialistic vs. non-imperialistic), East and West Germany during the cold war 
(capitalism vs. communism) or in North and South Korea today (democracy vs. 
totalitarianism). The aspects of each culture compared above are virtually 
identical, but variance in a whole host of factors resulted in changed behavior of 
the actors. Essentially, this leaves us with the reality that, while components of 
culture are most likely the driving force in terrorism, there is essentially no way to 
conclusively explain exactly how this happens with a general theory that applies 
to all political behavior.  
Second, for many, blaming aspects of culture is very unpopular. A 
wholesale indictment of a religion and the people that practice it appears to go 
against the values and norms practiced in the West. Even having a conversation 
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about religion can prove difficult. Consequently, since the events of 9/11 (where 
19 individuals espousing Islamic views conducted attacks in the name of “Allah”) 
public discourse on the relationship between Islam and terrorism has been 
severely limited and often awkward. Frequently, those desiring to explore the 
possible connections between religious motivation and political violence do so 
poorly and face harsh scrutiny. This discourages further discussion. Even when a 
more accurate and nuanced explanation of cultural variables is explored, the 
resistance to the effort is still strong. Some advocates of the cultural approach 
have even paid a personal and professional price for advancing their views, even 
when attempting to do so professionally and objectively.44  
Finally, the international community is likely to react negatively to such an 
approach. Referring back to the two-level game described by Putnam, American 
policy makers must not only respond to the demands of domestic audiences but 
also must account for the realities of the international system as well. This 
cultural approach runs this risk of being distasteful to the international 
community, particularly potential partners in the Middle Eastern community and 
in Europe. 
Are any other solutions, given the failure of both these approaches, in 
understanding the root causes of terrorism? What about models that include 
useful aspects of rational-materialism and cultural determinism? Recognizing the 
current problems with both models, researchers, such as Michael Mousseau, 
propose an institutional argument. This rational model suggests that it is the 
quality and structure of institutions that determines the stability of a society. 
Mousseau does not deny the importance of culture; rather he shows how “liberal-
democratic values and beliefs are embedded in the economic infrastructure that 
prevails in market democracies.”45 His institutional model, however, treats culture 
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as endogenous, or because of, varying types of institutions. This differs from the 
cultural model, which treats culture as exogenous, or as an independent variable. 
The solution to defeat terrorism using this model is to promote the transformation 
of clientalist economies, currently the norm in the Middle East, to market 
economies. Clientalist economies rely on implied cooperation and reciprocity, 
where in market economies, obligations and cooperation are explicit in legal 
contracts.46 This creates liberal values as Mousseau explains: 
The norm of cooperating with strangers on the basis of legal 
equality is the logical prerequisite for respecting the rule of common 
law…in these ways, markets develop and the liberal values of 
individualism, universalism, tolerance, and equity emerge 
concurrently with the rule of common law and democratic 
governance.47 
It is this exposure to the market economy through globalization and its embedded 
liberal values that is responsible for anti-market rage that expresses itself through 
terrorism. The solution therefore is to break the clientalist market and begin to 
replace it with the foundations of a market economy.48 
The advantage of this approach is that it takes the apparent strengths of 
the rational model (the objectivity of observable behavior) and marries it with the 
reality that cultural differences enable violence to produce a workable theory that 
can be empirically proven.49 Unfortunately, the institutional model has two 
primary weaknesses. First, it suffers from endogeneity. This is the problem of 
determining what causes what. Do institutions determine culture as he assumes, 
or does culture shape institutions? For example, market economies and Western 
civilization developed simultaneously, so which came first? Mousseau argues 
that the causal link between market economies and liberal values is ironclad, but 
the ongoing debate on the issue of “social capital” suggests the jury is still out on 
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the exact nature of the causal relationship.50 The second weakness of this 
approach is the assumption that laying the foundations of a market economy will 
actually lead to a market economy, and that the market economy will actually 
function optimally, regardless of the societal that framework it is laid upon. 
Mousseau’s argument calls for the imposition of the foundations of a market 
economy on the Middle East, but why is this expected to birth liberal values, 
since anger about those very market economies is fueling terrorism?51 Should 
we expect these nations, who chafe at rubbing against market economies 
because of globalism, to embrace it when it is rammed down their throats? I see 
no reason to suspect they will. 
When viewed in the light of the previous theories that attempt to explain 
the causes of terrorism, it is clear that the U.S. has pursued a strategy predicated 
upon the rational-materialist model. The first document that codified U.S. anti-
terror strategy after 9/11 was the National Security Strategy of 2002. In this, and 
in the revised 2006 document, President George W. Bush laid out his vision for 
dealing with terrorism. Democratization was offered as the primary prescription 
for the problem, with large doses of economic development thrown in as well. In 
fact, in the 2006 document, two pillars were presented as the foundation to the 
strategy: the first pillar was promoting democracy and economic prosperity and 
the second was working with democracies to defeat terror.52 This changed little 
with the election of President Barak Obama. While the primary focus on 
democracy was gone from the rhetoric, the Obama strategy continues the 
emphasis on democratization and development.53 Both Presidents also stressed 
building more effective institutions for combating terrorism. While these are not 
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explicitly market economy institutions, they do express belief in the notion that 
crafting the appropriate political and economic structures will result in the growth 
of liberal values. 
While cultural determinism is rightly rejected in U.S. strategy, the 
unfortunate side effect has been to reject discussion of any cultural aspects and 
how they might contribute to motivating political violence. As Coughlin points out, 
George W. Bush “made broad statements that held Islam harmless…effectively 
placing a policy bar on the unconstrained analysis of Islamic doctrine as a basis 
for this threat.”54 Islam was said to be a “religion of peace” and “hijacked by 
extremists,” and the President’s comments made it clear that while culture 
(religion) might be an issue, we would not be talking about it or evaluating it with 
any depth. President Obama furthered this rejection of cultural factors by 
completely removing the term jihad from the National Security Strategy of 2010 
and continues to insist that Islam has nothing to do with the U.S.’s current 
struggle.55 The repeated use of the term “universal values” in the 2010 document 
shuts the door to exploration of the cultural factors by effectively proclaiming that 
cultural differences are not at the root of the problem. 
In this way, the U.S. has demonstrated its belief in the assumption that the 
broadly applied rational-materialist concept adequately explains the underlying 
causes of terrorism and has pursued a strategy according to this model. Cultural 
determinism has been rejected, and with it, any exploration of cultural factors that 
may be contributing to motivating political violence. This is significant in that, on 
the one hand, U.S. strategy is rooted in assumptions that have been shown to be 
ineffective in dealing with the underlying causes of political violence, while on the 
other hand, U.S. policy makers refuse to explore the messy, but perhaps 
informative, world of cultural motivations. 
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It seems clear that a general theory explaining the underlying causes of 
terrorism, whether rational-materialism, cultural determinism or derivations 
thereof is simply unavailable. In evaluating the role of social science in 
counterterrorism, Nicholas Lemann comes to the same conclusion. He points the 
dearth of “logic that can be counted on to apply in all cases.”56 Later, in making 
the case that terrorism belongs in the political realm, Lemann continues, 
“[Terrorism is] a tactic whose aims bleed into the larger, endless struggle of 
people to control land, set up governments, and exercise power. History is about 
managing that struggle, sometimes successfully, sometimes not, rather than 
eliminating the impulses that underlie it.”  
This conclusion highlights two important points. First, trying to approach 
terrorism from a general theory that identifies underlying causes will prove 
fruitless, as we have already discovered. Subsequently, developing policy based 
on a general theory about terrorism, as the U.S. has done, is predestined to fail. 
Second, if Lemann is correct, we must ask what are the important components of 
“managing that struggle,” and how can we harness them to our advantage? 
Earlier in his essay, Lemann provides a possible answer. In critiquing General 
David Petraus’s approach to counterinsurgency, which contends that the 
minimum use of force is the most effective, Lemann quotes Mark Moyer who 
points out the significant effectiveness of “aggressive and well-led operations” 
that negatively affect the insurgency.57 Does this suggest that the application of 
force has something to do with the outcome of politically violent behavior? Is the 
appropriate use of force the way to “manage” those underlying “impulses” of 
terrorism and political violence? This will be explored in depth later. 
Here, however, it is imperative to discard the previously discussed general 
theories that erroneously attempt to explain all political behavior and focus on the 
problem at hand. Namely, the direct threat to the U.S. posed by Islamists who 
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employ, advocate for or sympathize with the use of violence to achieve their 
political goals. Recognizing the failure of the previous models to explain this 
phenomenon adequately, it may prove more useful to select instances in history 
where the U.S. was successful in dealing with an identical or near identical 
problem, and determining what factors were important in leading to success or 
failure. From this, it may be possible to identify key elements in addressing 
groups who employ political violence in the furtherance of their objectives.  
The next two chapters will explore two cases; the first is that of the Patriot 
movement, which emanated from the American Mid-West and was most potent 
in the 1990s. The second is that of violent Islamists, most notably Al Qaeda, 
whom the U.S. contends with today. I will place these groups in a population 
called “religious rebels.”58 Religious rebels are identified first by their partial or full 
adherence to supernaturally derived norms and preference ordering. Second, 
religious rebels participate in and/or support violent resistance against the 
established political order for establishing a political reality commensurate with 
their particular worldview.  
These religious rebel groups in the following cases present the two most 
significant non-state threats to American political power in contemporary times, 
and they share four key characteristics. First, these groups can trace their 
explosive rise in popularity to turbulent conditions. In both cases, severe 
economical turmoil brought on by the effects of globalization destroyed the 
traditional worldview of both rural Americans and many in the Middle East, 
causing them to cast about for an explanation to make sense of their new 
environment. Second, to explain these new conditions, both groups latched on to 
violent ideologies rooted in religion. Third, both groups display the similar 
organizational characteristics of small and loose networks. Lastly, the goals of 
both movements are identical. They do not recognize the U.S. government as a 
legitimate source of political power, they desire to remove U.S. government 
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authority from their local area, and they act to establish alternate power 
structures. The purpose of outlining the striking similarities between these 
religious rebels is to show they may be considered interchangeable. In each case 
study, the U.S. government’s response to both groups will be considered. From 
this examination, insight about the true nature of religious rebellion can be 
obtained.  
Heretofore, this thesis has considered the general theories that attempt to 
explain the underlying causes of political violence. None has proven adequate for 
dealing with the particular situation the U.S. government faces concerning 
religious rebels. This is due primarily to the failure of models that attempt to 
explain human behavior exclusively in terms of material gain and the inability to 
tease out crucial cultural factors in explaining terrorism. The following 
examination of religious rebels is not intended to present a working universal 
theory on the nature of all political violence; rather, it explores how the U.S. 
government responded to these groups and attempts to distill lessons that can 
be incorporated in strategy regarding these movements in the future.  
 22
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III. THE PATRIOTS 
The Patriot movement represented the most serious domestic threat to 
U.S. government authority since the tumultuous events of the 1960s. The ease 
with which Patriots chose violence as a means to achieve political change proved 
to be a serious challenge the American government. Ultimately, however, the 
government prevailed. This chapter will describe the conditions that brought 
about these Patriot groups, explore the role ideology played in the movement, 
explain the organizational characteristics of Patriot groups and examine how the 
U.S. government responded to this threat. 
It is useful to define exactly what is meant by the term “Patriot.” While the 
Patriot movement includes a diverse constituency of groups, it does coalesce 
around a specific set of beliefs and ideologies. As David Neiwert describes: 
The Patriot movement is an American political ideology based on 
an ultranationalistic and selective populism, which seeks to return 
the nation to its “constitutional” roots—that is, a system based on 
white Christian male rule. Its core myth is that such a reactionary 
revolution will bring about a great national rebirth, ending years of 
encroaching moral and political decadence wrought by a gigantic 
world conspiracy of probably Satanic origins.59 
The term “Patriot movement” (which Neiwert uses because its members 
use the term for themselves) includes groups, such as Neo-Nazis, adherents to 
Christian Identity, Sovereign Citizens, the Freeman, and many others. This 
movement is characterized by a dubious interpretation of the Protestant Bible 
and the U.S. Constitution. While the bombing by Timothy McVeigh of the Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 is the most memorable event involving 
this movement, it was essentially the last major violent incident wrought by 
groups associated with this ideology. The other significant violent events of the  
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1990s, the stand-offs at Ruby Ridge and Waco, were also the result of the clash 
between the U.S. government and the people adhering to Patriot ideals who 
accepted that violence was an appropriate tool to advance their worldview. 
A. ECONOMIC TURMOIL 
The rise of the Patriot movement can trace its beginnings to massive 
economic disruptions brought on by globalization. For most Patriots, the crisis 
began in the late 1970s. Globalization drove prices for crops so low that farmers 
were encouraged to “get big or get out.”60 Only by increasing output, farmers 
were told, would they be able to compete in the new global economy. 
Government lenders and private banks, which were chief among the voices 
persuading the farmers to take on debt, offered cheap credit and farmers were 
encouraged to buy as much land as they could. Consequently, farmland prices 
skyrocketed, and credit became so cheap that bankers would often call farmers 
and encourage them to assume more debt.61  
This ended in 1979, when the Federal Reserve sharply raised interest 
rates to curtail massive inflation. The move caused farm property values to fall at 
the very same time the interest rates on bank notes dramatically increased. This 
resulted in farm families being thrown off their farms in droves. From 1980 to 
1990, around 700,000 small to medium family farms were shut down.62 During 
1986 to 1987, during the worst years of the crisis, nearly one million people were 
removed from their land.  
While the most visible, the farmers were not the only ones affected. All of 
rural America felt the impact of globalization. Domestic manufacturing companies 
moved operations overseas to take advantage of cheap labor they previously 
                                            
60 Osha Gray Davidson, Broken Heartland: The Rise of America’s Rural Ghetto (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1996), 15. 
61 Joel Dyer, Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Only the Beginning (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1998), 15. 
62 Stuart A. Wright, Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 72. 
 25
found in rural America. In 1979, only 5% of non-metropolitan counties in the U.S. 
had an unemployment rate of 9% or higher, in 1984, that number jumped to 50 
percent.63 The economy of rural America was devastated by the effects of 
globalization in the last part of the twentieth century.  
The results were predictable. The suicide rate of farmers in the state of 
Oklahoma rose to over three times that of the general population, and that state 
trailed both Montana and Wisconsin in total number of farm suicides.64 While 
economic woes touched off the crisis that lead to the suicides, it was not 
necessarily for lack of money that farmers killed themselves. Many farmers who 
lost their land during the farm crisis were the third, fourth, or even fifth 
generations that worked their land. Far from just being a source of income, farm 
life, and indeed rural life in general, served as a source of core identity for many 
people.65 The turmoil resulted in more than financial troubles, as the land the 
farmers were thrown off represented family and faith. Farmers often described 
the loss of the farm as harder than loosing a loved one.66 That so many farmers 
committed suicide suggests that as they looked about for an explanation of who 
was to blame for their situation, farmers focused on the person in the mirror. That 
would all change, however, with the introduction of an ideology that placed the 
blame on someone else: the government. 
B. VIOLENT RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES 
The second characteristic of both the Patriots and violent Islamists is the 
prevalent role that religion plays in their ideology. This was part of a larger trend 
in religious violence at the end of the last century that David Rapaport termed the 
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“fourth wave” of terrorism.67 Chief among Rapaport’s examples are Islamists and 
Patriots. Similarly, when Mark Juergensmeyer explains his concept of “cosmic 
war,” the first two examples he points to are Islamists and Patriots.68 This is 
because it is widely accepted that Patriots and violent Islamists both internalize a 
violent ideology rooted in their respective religious traditions.  
In America, the devastation wrought by the destroyed rural economy left a 
void that was quickly filled by the diverse, but religiously grounded, anti-
government messages of groups like the Posse Comitatus, Christian Identity, 
Neo Nazis and others. Their conspiratorial message placed the blame for the 
current economic crisis on the government. In fact, it was their view that the 
government, controlled by a cabal of Jews, deliberately established a system in 
which the farmers were destined to fail.69 Given that the government and banks 
had encouraged farmers to leverage themselves to precarious levels, this made 
sense to some. The narrative was only vaguely embedded in the largely 
Protestant rural culture, but it was familiar enough that it resonated with many 
facing extreme hardship, as well as their friends and loved ones who bore 
witness to the suffering. The resulting worldview, which blended aspects of 
mutant Protestantism, white supremacy, Jewish conspiracy, and the corruption of 
the U.S. government, was essentially grounded in the notion that the U.S. 
government’s power was illegitimate.  
C. LOOSE NETWORKS 
The third shared characteristic of both groups is how they organized in a 
similar fashion of loose networks with limited central authority. This is largely a 
result of their pressures from their operational environment and reliance on pre-
formed social arrangements.  
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The American Patriot movement flourished among the rural relationships 
established from shared hardship and mutual interest. Support groups, the 
internet and the gun show circuit acted as convenient conduits for the message 
to spread.70 Additionally, suicide counselors (who were key figures in the early 
days of the farm crisis) choosing between the lesser of two evils, often referred 
hurting farmers to groups promoting the Patriot’s message.71 Law enforcement 
scrutiny would not allow the movement to coalesce around an organized 
hierarchy of leaders. Public promoters of violent anti-government rhetoric where 
soon identified and investigated. Violent confrontations with law enforcement 
almost always resulted in sovereignty adherents being killed. In recognition of the 
operational environment, sovereignty advocates, such as Louis Beam proposed 
the idea of “leaderless resistance.”72 Beam realized that a loose network of 
individuals and small groups bound by similar ideology was the only possible 
organizational structure that could survive increased government attention.  
D. REJECTION OF U.S. POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY  
Lastly, the Patriot movement and the violent Islamists share similar goals. 
Both groups resist submission to the political will of the U.S. government, want to 
drive the U.S. out of their political sphere and establish a new government based 
on alternative notions of sovereignty.  
A major reason the Patriot movement rejects the sovereignty of the U.S. 
government is the failure of the American legal system to represent properly (in 
the minds of the Patriots) the interests of rural America. As banks began to take 
over farms at an alarming rate, desperate farmers were all too ready to submit to 
an alternate form of government that promised to look out for their concerns. This 
alternate system revolved around “common law courts.” Common law courts 
consisted of a “jury” of “sovereign citizens.” To qualify as a sovereign citizen, 
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Patriots simply reject their U.S. citizenship.73 This often occurred in the form of a 
written declaration to a local, state, federal or international authority.”74 These 
courts, established in lieu of the U.S. political and legal system, pass judgments 
amenable to the Patriot cause. These judgments range from indictments of public 
officials for failing to abide by their constitutional duties to reversing foreclosures 
on farms. The significance of the common law courts should not be ignored; they 
essentially provide the moral authority the Patriots need to conduct operations, 
especially violent ones, against the U.S. government. 
E. FAILURE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE THE THREAT  
Given the economic crisis occurring in the American heartland and the 
subsequent tearing at the social fabric that it created, the U.S. government 
should have anticipated problems with Patriot groups.75 Community meetings, 
bank foreclosure events and suicide hotlines filled with angry rhetoric about the 
government conspiracy to destroy farmers, but Patriots went even further to 
telegraph their intent. A popular tactic of this group was to write letters to 
government authorities stating that they no longer viewed the U.S. government 
as legitimate and would no longer  to its laws. In fact, Vicky Weaver, who was 
later shot in the head by an FBI sniper while holding her baby during the Ruby 
Ridge stand off, wrote such a letter to the U.S. attorney for Idaho.76 Also, people 
in sovereign groups would often post notices on their property that told visitors 
that the federal government had no jurisdiction on their land. In addition, on 
Randy Weaver’s U.S. Marshall’s file, he was simply labeled as uncooperative 
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and a “crackpot.”77 These descriptions of him, however, did not accurately 
convey Weaver’s attitude. Weaver was not uncooperative; he was defiant to the 
point of death. There existed plenty of clues that clearly signaled the intent of 
people in the sovereignty movement.  
This inaccurate view of the threat directly resulted in the failure of the U.S. 
to counter the threats posed by these groups effectively. In the case of the Patriot 
movement, the U.S. Marshalls and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms 
(BATF) both launched tactical raids on the Ruby Ridge and Waco compounds 
that resulted in the death of federal agents. Despite the threats expressed by the 
groups and despite the intelligence gathered from inside the respective 
compounds about their apocalyptic ideology, the federal agents who planned the 
raids did not anticipate the virulent resistance that the Weaver family and the 
followers of Koresh would mount.  
F. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERREACTS 
Regardless of the failure to anticipate the threat, the U.S. was caught off 
guard at the ability of these groups to inflict damage. The surprising performance 
of these groups against the government caused a significant overreaction. At 
Ruby Ridge, U.S. Marshalls knowingly provoked Randy Weaver’s dog and then 
killed the dog as it tried to play with them in full view of Randy’s fourteen-year old 
son Samuel. As the agents had not yet identified themselves, Samuel opened 
fire to protect his dog, and the resulting firefight killed one U.S. Marshall and 
Samuel. After the six, well-armed U.S. Marshalls were dislodged from the 
mountain by the now dead teenager and a family friend, the FBI crisis response 
group that assumed command of the operation suspended the traditional rules of 
engagement and allowed for the immediate killing of any adult male with a 
weapon.78 The result was that Vicky Weaver was shot in the head while holding 
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the door open for her husband who was running back into the house after being 
shot himself. Similarly, the BATF lost four agents conducting a military style raid 
against a group of people adhering to an apocalyptic worldview. Again, the FBI 
was brought in to assume command and the end result was the death by fire of 
over 76 people, including over 20 children. These results were absolutely 
unacceptable to the American public and gave rise to a growing concern in the 
country that the narrative of the Patriot groups, which was previously dismissed, 
might actually have some merit. Congress called various members of the 
sovereignty movement to testify, Phil Donohue hosted a group of militia members 
on his show and John Trochmann, the leader of the Militia of Montana, won a 
debate hosted by the Yale Student Political Union over the issue. These people 
would have been considered loons in any other context, but the overreaction of 
the U.S. government validated their worldview in the eyes of many Americans.  
G. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ADJUSTS 
In the wake of the Ruby Ridge and Waco debacles, law enforcement 
agencies in the U.S. government changed their policies on how to deal with 
ideological dissidents. Previously, law enforcement officers were accustomed to 
dealing with criminals who typically responded to overwhelming force with 
compliance. Understanding, however, that apocalyptic ideology was part and 
parcel with the Patriot movement and that the assaulting agents were seen as 
the devil incarnate, new law enforcement procedures were identified.79 This 
approach did not eliminate the use of force against these groups; they simply 
altered the way force was used. For example, once a standoff ensued, the FBI 
placed command of operations against sovereignty groups in the hands of 
negotiators, not the tactical teams. Additionally, the FBI was very careful to 
control the surrounding environment without rushing to dislodge barricaded 
subjects. The first opportunity to try out these new tactics occurred at the 
Freeman standoff in Montana in 1996. Over the course of a year, the FBI slowly 
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and methodically tightened its noose around the Freeman group. It even allowed 
the group to move locations. The slow process diffused any support that the 
Freeman may have gotten from the outside. Instead of playing to the hand of the 
Freeman, the FBI wielded decisive force over the group and caused it to fracture 
under its own weight. The standoff ended without incident. This application of 
force, which recognized the role that ideology played in the Patriot movement, 
allowed the U.S. government to capitalize on the perception of public opinion 
further as it swung away from these groups in the wake of the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995. The way in which the U.S. government conducted the Freeman 
standoff, and the subsequent Republic of Texas standoff, severely damaged 
Patriot groups and signaled the beginning of the movements decline.80 
Brought about by economic turmoil and fueled by a violent ideology with 
roots in rural culture, the Patriot movement proved to be a significant challenge to 
the U.S. government. By recognizing the role ideology played in the movement, 
however, the U.S. government was able to craft a strategy that ultimately lead to 
the decline of the movement. 
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IV. VIOLENT ISLAMISTS 
Any remaining concerns about the Patriot movement took a back seat to 
violent Islamists after the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda, 
the chief violent Islamist group, embodies the values that define the movement. 
This chapter will examine how this movement came about, outline the 
organizational characteristics of violent Islamists, and explore how the U.S. 
government has responded to this threat.  
While more fresh in the public mind, it is still useful to define exactly who 
are “violent Islamists.” Violent Islamists, quite simply, hold that Islam is to be 
viewed not just as a religion but a political system directing all aspects of public 
and private life and that this worldview is to be realized through any means 
possible, including armed force.  
A. ECONOMIC TURMOIL 
Like the Patriot movement, violent Islamism has benefited from economic 
turbulence. Statist economic policies combined with the oil boom (which was 
brought on by global demand for petroleum products) in Middle Eastern countries 
caused massive rural-urban migration in the 1960s and 1970s.81 Traditional 
identity markers, such as being Arab or Muslim, decreased in significance, 
replaced by Arab Nationalism and reliance on the welfare state.82 In the 1980s 
and 1990s, the oil market crashed, and Middle Eastern governments were 
unable to make good on their promises. The variance between expectations and 
reality for many Muslims proved too great.83 The inability of young, semi-
educated Muslims to find fulfillment in a career and marriage created a serious 
                                            
81 Alan Richards, “Toward a Political Economy of Islamism: Grievances and Collective 
Action,” unpublished manuscript, 5. 
82 Nazhi Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 
1991), 167. 
83 Michael Freeman, “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic 
Analysis of U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008): 50. 
 34
identity crisis in a culture that still valued traditional norms.84 The failure of the 
secular order created space for violent Islamists to spread the message that 
salvation would only result from turning toward Allah for all solutions for the 
problems facing Muslims. This was certainly the case for Osama Bin Laden and 
his associates as Steve Coll illustrates,  
The combustible interactions of wealth [and lack of wealth] and 
Islamic faith, Bedouin tradition and global culture, had opened deep 
fault lines in the Saudi kingdom. Osama bin Laden had fallen 
through the cracks, and here he was, in a mud-walled compound 
on the outskirts of Kandahar, preaching revolution.85 
B. VIOLENT RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY 
In the Middle East, the message of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, 
and others found large appeal in many respects, because it is embedded in 
Islamic culture. The economic conditions described above only served to fuel the 
spread.86 Faced with the rampant march of secularism, the failure to defeat the 
Jewish state and the economic prowess of the West, salvation presented itself in 
the form of the return to fundamentalist Islam. Muslim thinkers, such as Mawdudi, 
Qutb, and Khomeni had already laid the ideological groundwork required for the 
movement to spread in the 1960s.87 Osama bin Laden and his associates 
elevated the cause to all out global war in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamism 
benefitted in this environment in many respects, because it was untainted and 
unassociated with the failed secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism.88 As 
with the case of the Patriot movement, the result was catastrophic.  
                                            
84 Richards, “Toward a Political Economy of Islamism,” 4. 
85 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from 
the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 50. 
86 William R. Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order since 1945, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 457. 
87 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 5. 
88 Freeman, “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of 
U.S. Policy,” 50. 
 35
C. LOOSE NETWORKS 
Repressive Middle Eastern governments and effective Western law 
enforcement and military capabilities convinced violent Islamists that small and 
loose networks were the only organization that would allow them to effectively 
fight.89 While the nature of the networks has changed over time, the reality 
remains that violent Islamist must operate in small and loose networks. Mark 
Sageman presents his “three waves of radicalization” to describe how these 
networks developed over time.90 The first wave consists of the veteran of Soviet 
war in Afghanistan, of which maybe a couple dozen exist today. The second 
wave is educated expatriates from Muslim countries radicalized in the West who 
journeyed to Afghanistan seeking acceptance and training from Al Qaeda. These 
are the cohort that conducted the 9/11 attacks and number approximately 100 
today. Lastly, are the potential thousands of local recruits who are believers in 
the Al Qaeda cause who have used personal relationships with other violent 
Islamists and the internet to maintain only the loose connections required to 
continue operations? Channeling Louis Beam, Abu Musab al-Suri a.k.a 
Mustapha Setmariam Nasr, wrote “The Call to Global Leaderless Resistance,” 
which “is a strategy of fighting an overwhelming enemy using self-organizing 
clandestine networks.”91 Just like the Patriots, violent Islamists consist of like-
minded groups that reduce their operational risk by reducing their linkages to 
each other and centralized leadership.  
D. REJECTION OF U.S. POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY  
Violent Islamists explicitly call for the expulsion of U.S. political influence, 
not only directly in the case of American military power, but also in the form of 
U.S. support to secular Middle Eastern regimes and Israel. In his 1996 
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Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Places, Osama Bin Laden declares that American military forces (who 
incidentally are the primary reason that economic troubles have been visited 
upon Saudi Arabia) must be driven out of the Middle East. In his 1998 Fatwa, 
(which was also signed by other Islamists from Pakistan, Egypt, and Bangladesh) 
Bin Laden again called for the expulsion of American power from the “lands of 
Islam.” Islamists have been successful at various times establishing some form 
of Islamic government in places, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Sudan. 
Ultimately, the goal of violent Islamists (and the dream of many moderate 
Muslims) is to establish the Caliphate, placing all historically Muslim lands under 
the control of an Islamist government, replacing the secular nation-state system 
advocated by the U.S. in place today.92 Whether in Montana or Mecca, both the 
Patriots and violent Islamists seek to drive out U.S. political influence and replace 
it with a system of their own design. 
E. FAILURE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE THE THREAT  
Osama Bin Laden clearly signaled his intent against the U.S. government 
in his 1996 Declaration of War and 1998 Fatwa, which both preceded the U.S. 
embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the 9/11 attacks. 
Despite plenty of evidence of a serious threat, the response of the U.S. 
government to these signals indicated a lack of understanding and a dismissive 
attitude. Steve Coll has laid out in detail the failure of the U.S. government to 
understand the significance of the treat posed by Al Qaeda adequately. Aside for 
Bin Laden’s declarations, U.S. government intelligence understood very clearly 
as early as 1998 that Al Qaeda intended to attack inside the United States.93 The 
U.S. government failed to act against Bin Laden, however, because they did not 
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adequately understand the threat and therefore the political costs we presumed 
too high.94 By late 2000, despite “weekly” indications that Al Qaeda was 
preparing “spectacular” attacks against the U.S., the American government 
continued to take no action against Bin Laden.95 Ultimately, despite the previous 
World Trade Center attack, the knowledge that terrorist operatives were learning 
to fly passenger aircraft and mounting evidence that Al Qaeda was planning a 
spectacular attack, the U.S. completely failed to anticipate the attacks on 9/11.96 
F. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVERREACTS 
The U.S. government’s initial invasion of Afghanistan with small numbers 
of special operations forces was not only successful in routing the Taliban and 
disrupting Al Qaeda, but also was widely seen as a legitimate response to 9/11. 
Unfortunately, the subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, along with the 
occupation of Iraq, is viewed by many in the Muslim world as an attack on Islam 
writ large.97,98 America, fresh from the attacks of 9/11, invaded Iraq ostensibly to 
remove the potential threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
against American targets. This was deemed necessary in a post 9/11 world. After 
WMD were never found, mission success was then defined by the existence of a 
self-sustaining democratic government, restored security apparatus and 
rehabilitated infrastructure. In order to accomplish this, however, the U.S. military 
was required to stay and provide the heavy lifting for this effort. While some 
Americans may have viewed this strategy as altruistic, it is unquestionably clear 
that many in the Muslim world viewed it as nothing short of an attack on Islam. 
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Similarly, in Afghanistan, instead of leaving after the goal of disrupting Al Qaeda 
operations in the safe haven that was provided by the now routed Taliban, the 
U.S. military was asked to stay and rebuild there, as well. These occupations 
constituted an overreaction on the part of the U.S. government. Unfortunately, 
this completely validated the message of Al Qaeda, a group that under normal 
circumstances does not enjoy the support of the many Muslims people due to 
their draconian tactics and extreme worldview. Under conditions of occupation, 
however, Al Qaeda has a captive audience. 
G. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ADJUSTS 
When faced with the reality of over-reaction, the U.S. government’s 
approach to violent Islamists departs from the response to the Patriot movement. 
First, questioning the ideological forces behind violent Islamists has been taken 
off the table. Under the George Bush administration, Islam was deemed to be a 
“religion of peace,” but there was no reluctance to use variations of the word 
“Islamic” when describing enemy groups. Today, the Obama administration has 
taken a different approach and remove all language associated with the Islamic 
religion from the American defense lexicon. Both approaches are incorrect. While 
finding evidence of a causal relationship between ideology and political violence 
may be difficult, it is clear that ideology plays a role in social movements.99 While 
American policy makers want to focus on rational materialistic models for 
understanding how to relate to the Middle East, it seems clear that addressing 
the “values and beliefs” of the people we wish to influence would be much more 
productive.100 Therefore, making broad and uninformed statements about the 
nature of Islam or ignoring the subject of religion altogether, are both 
inappropriate ways of dealing with the ideological foundations of society in the 
Middle East.  
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Second, as we have learned from the study of Patriot groups, a failure to 
understand what motivates violence leads to the incorrect application of force. In 
the fight against violent Islamists, the U.S. has pursued a dubious 
“counterinsurgency” strategy, which relies heavily on building democratic 
institutions and fostering economic development. In order to accomplish the 
“clear, hold, and build” techniques of this strategy, however, large conventional 
forces are required to secure the political space. We have already seen how 
these conventional forces occupying Muslim lands, pursuing goals predicated on 
faulty assumptions, only serves to feed the narrative of violent Islamists.  
The origin and nature of violent Islamist groups is significantly similar to 
the Patriot movement. The handling of violent Islamists by the U.S. government, 
however, has been markedly different to the approach taken toward the Patriots. 
In order to be successful against groups like Al Qaeda, the U.S. government 
needs to learn from the general principles it discovered while dealing with the 
Patriot movement. Namely, choosing a means of applying force that accounts for 
the real motivating force for religious rebels: ideological orientation. 
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V. IDEOLOGY 
The change in U.S. strategy against the Patriot movement reflected the 
understanding that what motivated members of the movement was not material 
gain, but ideology. Once the FBI accounted for this factor, their operations 
against Patriots were immediately successful and the movement began to wither. 
To be sure, a contributing factor to the demise of the Patriot movement was also 
the change in public perception as a result of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
however, employing the previously-used heavy-handed tactics (such as those 
employed at Ruby Ridge and Waco) at the Freeman compound immediately 
following the Murrah buildings destruction, would have gone a long way to 
legitimizing McVeigh’s attack. 
How did recognizing and accounting for ideology assist the U.S. 
government in its struggle against the Patriots? Essentially, the federal 
government identified the direct link between stated ideology and observed 
behavior. Previously, the U.S. government expected the Patriots to behave in 
ways commensurate with criminals whose behavior generally reflected a material 
cost-benefit analysis. When faced with over-whelming force, the costs of 
resistance became too high, and the criminals submitted to authority. With the 
Patriots, however, the U.S. government realized that the standard material cost-
benefit calculus was absent. In its place was an ideology that established, in 
many cases, death as more preferential than arrest. This recognition 
necessitated an entirely new approach to handling groups associated with the 
Patriot movement. If we can assume that Patriots and violent Islamists are 
sufficiently similar, the implications are clear: the U.S. government’s current 
strategy to deal with violent Islamists is inadequate. Instead, taking lessons from 
past campaigns against religious rebels, the U.S. must understand the ideology 
of the violent Islamists and determine appropriate ways in which to apply force in 
order to be successful against this movement. 
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What is there to understand about ideology? First, ideology is crucial in 
determining behavior of actors. Second, once ideology is selected it serves to 
limit the behavioral outcomes of those actors. Third, introducing facts and logical 
explanations to counter ideology is not only likely to fail, but may also serve to 
reinforce the actors’ chosen ideology. Lastly, the correct application of force is 
often the only action that can affect their ideological stance. This chapter 
examines this process. 
Is it true that exploring ideology is crucial to understanding behavior? 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane assert that it is. In examining the 
influence that ideas have on foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane conclude that 
understanding “ideas” is critical to understanding the behavior of actors.101 They 
freely admit that material concerns are important as well, but ignoring ideology 
will fail to explain behavior adequately. John David Lewis stresses the 
importance of ideology in not only the actions of terrorists, but also the forces 
fighting them. Lewis states, “Differences in technology, politics, or economics will 
always remain secondary to the ideas that motivate aggressors to launch bloody 
attacks and that empower–or restrain–defenders opposing those attacks.”102 
Ultimately, ideology matters because it does directly affect the behavior of those 
engaged in and supporting political violence. As the previous authors note in their 
work, other factors are present, but ideology is paramount. 
Why is ideology such a strong motivator of behavior? In addressing this 
issue, Heather S. Gregg provides a useful definition for ideology. Ideology 
provides, “a set of beliefs for how the world ought to be, a critique of how the 
world currently is, and a course of action for realizing that world [i.e., the world 
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that ought to be].”103 Lane Crothers further highlights the ability of ideology to 
make sense of an extremely complex world, simplify reality and give 
prescriptions for how “individuals ought to behave.”104 When Americans in the 
Midwest faced the onslaught of the farm crisis the Patriot ideology adequately 
explained what was happening and what needed to happen in order for the 
chaos to go away. Additionally, the ideology of the Patriots legitimized the use of 
force to bring about this change. When the U.S. government over reacted to the 
Patriot movement, it not only validated the ideology of the movement, but it also 
served to further justify the use of violence for the cause. Ideology so strongly 
impacts behavior because contained in it are prescriptions for how and why 
action must be taken. 
How do ideologies do this? Goldstein and Keohane compare ideologies to 
“road maps.”105 Road maps serve to “limit choice because [they] logically 
exclude other interpretations of reality, or at least suggests that such 
interpretations are not worthy of sustained exploration.” Humans have a finite 
ability to collect and process information, and ideology streamlines this process 
and makes the complex world simple. The “road map” analogy is extremely 
useful for several reasons. First, just like a road map, ideology places the actor in 
the world. Just as the traveler verifies his location on the road map and is then 
able understand his place in the transportation network; ideology places the actor 
in his right location in the political and/or social environment. Second, the road 
map simplifies a seemingly complex network of roadways. Ideology untangles 
the complexities of life and presents a simple outlook in its place. Third, this 
analogy illustrates the power of ideologies in laying out a plan (or plans) of 
action. Without the map the motorists has a seemingly infinite number of routes 
to take to get to a destination. Similarly, without ideology, the actor is lost to 
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understand in which direction to go. Fourth, just like an actual road map, there 
are a limited number of paths to take. In fact, it is often clear when looking at the 
road map that there is only one path to take. Similarly, ideology presents the 
actor with a clear choice. Lastly, the motorist convinced that his road map is 
correct and that he had identified the “right” route to take to reach his destination, 
is not easily dissuaded from changing course. Similarly, ideology presents a clear 
plan of action and once selected, the actor is not well inclined to select another 
route, unless the current one is absolutely untenable. It seems very clear then 
that once an ideology is selected, there is no “going back” unless the “route” the 
actor selected is somehow blocked.  
The Patriot road map helped rural Americans understand their place in the 
world and simplified an extremely complex and volatile situation. It not only 
provided a direction for the Patriot movement, but a specific route: that of violent 
rebellion. Once on that route, the Patriots did not display any indication that they 
would be easily “re-routed.” This illustrates the peculiar affect that ideology has 
on people; namely, that once an ideology is selected, there seems to be fewer 
options for changing it. This phenomenon is precisely why appealing to 
ideologues with material incentives to change behavior or trying to engage in 
dialogue hoping to change minds is so often ineffective.  
Why is this the case? Research indicates that instead of facts dictating 
belief, our beliefs have a strong impact on what facts we choose to accept.106 
The implications of this are clear: whatever ideology an actor subscribes to is 
likely to only be reinforced as new information is received, regardless of whether 
or not the input supports or disproves the viewpoint. This dynamic seems 
especially prevalent among political partisans, confirming that actors who hold 
strong beliefs will likely try and fit all new information that they gather about their 
environment into their worldview. In fact, even when the facts directly counter the 
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beliefs of the actor, they are likely to make the actors beliefs even stronger.107 
This explains why appealing to a rational process, through economic 
development or democratization, will not work. From the perspective of the U.S., 
these are wonderful incentives to marginalizing violent behavior. In reality 
however, these efforts only reinforce whatever ideology the target audience 
already holds. This evidence has profound implications for dealing with religious 
rebels. If any new inputs are likely only to reinforce their deeply held beliefs, any 
attempt at rationalizing or negotiating will likely fail, as these efforts will only be 
viewed through the lens of their particular worldview. 
If this is true, are there any solutions to dealing with religious rebels so 
intensely driven by ideology? It turns out that there may be one solution. 
Researchers have discovered that only when actors are presented with blunt, 
unmistakable evidence that directly counters the central premise of their 
ideology, are they inclined to change their beliefs. James Kuklinski and Paul 
Quirk, in a study on attitude and beliefs about welfare policy, conclude that actors 
consider information that adjusts their beliefs only when “it is presented in a way 
that virtually compel[s] attention and reflection.”108 How does this translate to 
political violence? David Tucker highlights the research of many scholars when 
he concludes, “in the strategic struggle between those that use terrorism and 
those who oppose them, the side that wins is generally the side that best controls 
and limits its use of force.”109 This was certainly the case with the Patriot 
movement. The U.S. government’s over-reaction at Waco and Ruby Ridge only 
served to reinforce the Patriots beliefs. When the U.S. government acted in a 
way that was completely opposite of what the Patriots expected (and, given the 
length of the standoff, had a lot of time to think about it) their adherence to their 
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ideology began to crack. In this case, it was the careful adjustment to the way 
force was used that proved decisive precisely because it forced the Patriots to 
reevaluate their worldview.  
How does the use of force defeat religious rebels? To understand this it is 
useful to look at the concept of the “mobilizing trinity.” This psychological concept 
proposes that actors “fight or resist so long as three essential beliefs are held.”110 
The trinity consists of a belief in something that is “good,” which is to be 
promoted or defended, a belief in something that is “evil” and must be destroyed 
or resisted, and a belief that the “good cause” will ultimately prevail. Ideology 
constructs this trilogy, and the correct application of force is crucial for 
dismantling it.  
For the Patriots, the cause of the rural American farmer struggling to keep 
his land was good, and the government working to take the land was evil. The 
various legal schemes and the willingness to use force provided the third leg of 
the trilogy, the possibility that they could prevail against the government. The 
U.S. government facilitated the Patriot mobilizing trinity by misapplying the use of 
force, thereby further casting themselves as the evil entity. Additionally, when 
Patriot legal and tactical actions were successful and viewed as legitimate by 
many members of the population, it gave the Patriots the sense that they may, in 
fact, be able to win the war with the federal government.  
When the U.S. government altered their strategy, however, that changed. 
The government’s refusal to storm barricaded Patriots removed the image of the 
government as the evil Goliath and the Patriots as the defenseless David. 
Rather, the government’s handling of the standoffs with the Freeman and the 
Republic of Texas served to erode all three elements of the mobilization trinity. 
First, by not over reacting with force, the government sharply increased its 
legitimacy, not only with the general population, but also with the population more 
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inclined to support the Patriots and even with the Patriots themselves. Second, 
by not accommodating the Patriot desire for a violent stand off, the government 
created time and space for fissures within the Patriot movement to develop. 
Instead of the Patriots holding an “us verses them” mentality against the 
government, they began to view each other with suspicion as the crucible of an 
armed stand off wore down the participants. Finally, the government strictly 
controlled all aspects of the stand offs, slowly wearing down the Patriots belief 
that a successful outcome was possible. 
The same concept can be applied to violent Islamists today. Currently, the 
actions of the U.S. only serve to reinforce the Islamist mobilizing trinity. The U.S. 
pursuit of a “counterinsurgency” strategy in the Middle East has resulted in the 
employment of large numbers of conventional forces. The presence of these 
forces only serves to validate the narrative of the Islamists and reinforce the 
“goodness” of their cause. The way in which the U.S. conducts the 
counterinsurgency through imposing democratic institutions and economic 
development, verifies the “evil” intentions of the U.S. to destroy Islamic culture. 
That the U.S. has been wildly ineffective in this endeavor strengthens the belief 
of many in the Muslim world that the cause of the violent Islamists is bound to be 
victorious.  
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given what has been learned about the importance of ideology, what 
would an effective strategy against violent Islamists look like? Both Gregg and 
Lewis, who evaluated in depth the importance of ideology in motivating violent 
Islamists, offer two different solutions.  
Lewis insists the first step is to attack and destroy the Islamic totalitarian 
state of Iran. He argues that Iran represents the “political, economic, and 
ideological center of [political Islam],” and is therefore the logical starting point for 
a war against violent Islamism.111 Lewis’ point is predicated on the assumption 
that breaking the state of Iran will “demonstrate the spectacular failure and 
incompetence of the Islamic fundamentalist movement as a whole,” and that 
other nations will alter their behavior as a result. The desired goal? Sending a 
message to the world that “political Islam is finished.”  
This idea is interesting because it seeks to dismantle the mobilizing trinity 
by destroying the belief that the cause can be successful. Unfortunately, this 
approach has significant weaknesses. First, Lewis’s plan assumes that it would 
only take the destruction of Iran to render the idea of political Islam obsolete in 
the Muslim world; perhaps; but it is just as likely that the U.S. would have to 
move on to destroy the governments of other Middle Eastern countries as well. 
Second, Lewis’s plan does not address the other two aspects of the mobilizing 
trinity; that of belief in the Islamist cause as good and the belief that the U.S. is 
evil. If anything, Lewis’s approach will only serve to strengthen those two legs of 
the trilogy. Given then that success of the approach would be predicated on 
achieving the desired effects of making political Islam unpopular in the Muslim 
world, this plan leaves a lot to be desired. Finally, Lewis himself addresses the 
primary obstacle to carrying out this plan: the complete lack of political will in the 
U.S. for such an undertaking. 
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Gregg takes a different approach. She calls for fostering a “market place 
of ideas” where Islamism’s claims can be exposed to rational scrutiny and 
challenged. Gregg insists that, “the persistence of revolutionary Islam suggests 
that these ideas need to be countered in order to strike at the root of the problem 
driving Islamically motivated terrorism and insurgency.”112 Gregg further 
indicates that, “challenging the vision for a better world promised by revolutionary 
Islam is the best means for fighting the ideology. Ultimately, ideologies are 
countered through competing worldviews that offer hope and a better vision for 
how to live.”113 To do this, Gregg recommends such practical solutions as 
magnifying the infighting between revolutionary Islamic groups, leveraging U.S. 
universities and learning institutions to create places where Islamic ideologies 
can be presented and debated, and encouraging Muslim nations to cultivate 
debate on the role of Islam in their societies. 
This approach is interesting because it seeks to dismantle two legs of the 
mobilization trinity; that of the belief that the violent Islamist cause is good and 
the U.S. is evil. By indirectly fostering debate on the nature of political Islam, 
Gregg’s plan seeks to erode support for violent Islamists by demonstrating that 
their cause is anything but good and that the U.S. and other Western powers are 
not the devils they are made to be. While certainly a viable option as part of a 
range of strategies, this approach may not be singularly adequate for three 
reasons. First, Gregg’s recommendations do not address the third leg of the 
mobilizing trinity. Nothing in this approach appears to counter the belief that the 
cause of the violent Islamist can win. While it may seek to present Islamism as 
undesirable, it does not present it as unobtainable. Second, this approach 
assumes that once Muslims begin to engage in rational debate about political 
Islam, they will be turned off by the message. Our earlier examination about how 
people process new information into their current worldview, however, indicates 
this may not be completely effective. Finally, Gregg herself indicates how the 
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U.S. government can only play an indirect and minor role in executing this 
strategy. Gregg explains that any direct attempt by the U.S. to craft a 
counterargument to Islamism will only be seen as propaganda only and only 
serve to reinforce the widely held belief that American is out to destroy Islamic 
culture. 
What would be ideal is an approach that adequately addresses all three 
legs of the mobilizing trinity. Such an example exists in the “Sovereignty 
Solution,” proposed by Anna Simons and her students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.114 This calls for the strengthening of the concept of sovereignty by 
holding political leaders accountable for the actions of their peoples. Under this 
plan, if political violence were directed against the U.S., the U.S. would approach 
the leadership who “owns” the offending parties and demand resolution. The U.S. 
would then unilaterally take action based on the response of the offending 
government. If the government complies, the U.S. could assist wherever and 
however the foreign government saw fit. If the foreign government did not 
comply, the U.S. would destroy that government (and not rebuild it), reinforcing 
the concept of sovereignty by forcing leaders to remain accountable for the 
actions of their people and the people operating within their particular political 
boundaries. 
This concept is interesting, as it completely rejects the notion that 
economic development and democratization can achieve peaceful results. It 
abandons the current efforts the U.S. makes in distributing global economic aid 
as it recognizes the negative impact that economic development has, not only on 
reducing terrorism, but also in retarding natural economic activity in the 
designated region. Additionally, this approach discards the current policy of 
insisting that other nations comply with our particular ideological standards  
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(democracy). It recognizes the right of other nations and peoples to do with their 
polities as they like, yet demands that they do not tolerate those that are 
responsible for attacking others in the global community. 
This idea is worth consideration because it attacks all three legs of the 
mobilizing trinity. First, by refusing to interject their ideological values on other 
nations, the U.S. would reduce the belief that the U.S. is evil for imposing their 
values on Middle Eastern peoples by destroying Islam. Additionally, U.S. 
financial and political support for regimes of questionable character that are 
pervasive in the Middle East would cease, further removing the stigma the U.S. 
has of supporting oppressive regimes to suit its purposes. Second, by 
abandoning the counterinsurgency approach to solving terrorism, the U.S. would 
no longer engage in the occupation of Muslim lands, which serves as the single 
biggest issue garnering violent Islamists’ support in the Middle East. This would 
go a long way to reducing the belief that violent Islamists are “good,” as it would 
remove the “us versus them” mentality that resonates today. Lastly, this 
approach would eliminate the belief that the struggle of the violent Islamists to 
destroy America would ever be successful. Given the U.S.’s ability to project 
military force globally, there are few places where uncooperative governments 
could hide. Essentially, once it is established that support for Al Qaeda is 
equivalent to a death sentence, the operational freedom that this group enjoys 
today would be significantly, and perhaps catastrophically, reduced. Thus, this 
approach addresses all three aspects of the mobilizing trinity and serves as a 
viable option for dealing with religious rebels. 
A cautionary note about an approach, such as this, is appropriate here. 
Two key aspects of this argument call for unilateral military action against foreign 
governments only as a last resort and never as a preemptive measure. This 
would require the U.S. to assume a certain amount of risk and be very disciplined 
in applying this strategy, which may not always be easy. For example, what 
occurs when credible information of impending attacks is gained? In this 
scenario, the U.S. may be tempted to strike offending governments before it is 
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attacked. Similarly, what if there existed less than credible information of an 
impending attack, but domestic political realities did not allow for even a chance 
of a terrorist attack. Would the U.S. use its sovereignty argument to strike in this 
instance as well? These scenarios create a situation where the optimal strategy 
appears to be attacking foreign governments first and not waiting until after the 
attack to levy the demand to turn over the offenders or face the consequences. It 
is important to remember that options for disrupting impending attacks outside of 
preemptive strikes on foreign governments exist. Further, using the sovereignty 
solution in a way described above would not appropriately address the mobilizing 
trinity.  
Ultimately, the “sovereignty solution” illustrates how force might be used to 
disrupt the mobilizing trinity and is simply one approach that can be considered. 
Certainly this approach does not represent the perfect solution for every case, 
but it is important to understand that any approach should address how political 
violence is actually motivated. By understanding how ideology creates “road 
maps” and constructs the mobilizing trinity, strategies can be employed to 
establish roadblocks, destroy roads, and/or break apart trilogies. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Current U.S. strategy, as it applies to violent Islamists, is based on flawed 
assumptions about what motivates people to engage in and support political 
violence. Of the two primary theories that account for political violence offered in 
the contemporary literature, rational-materialism and the cultural determinism, 
the U.S. has based its approach on the former. It has been shown, however, that 
rational-materialism does not adequately explain terrorism or any other form of 
political violence. Any policy predicated on this assumption, therefore is destined 
to fail. Cultural determinism, however, also fails to usefully inform a coherent 
policy on dealing with Islamic terrorism. Instead of relying on a universal theory 
explaining political violence, the U.S. should seek to first understand the role that 
ideology plays in motivating political violence within the context that it exists. 
Once policymakers understand the ideology that spawns political violence, they 
are in a much better position to craft strategy that will sufficiently destroy the 
mobilizing structures of these religious rebels. 
Critics should not assume that an examination of political Islam is an 
inherently discriminatory exercise; or one in which judgments will necessarily be 
passed on to an entire religious group. During the Patriot crisis, analysts were 
certainly able to distinguish between the beliefs of Episcopalians and the violent 
ideology of Christian Identity. Similarly, there is no reason why a thoughtful 
evaluation of political Islam cannot distinguish between violent actors determined 
to impose their ideology on their neighbors and the world and peaceful followers 
of the Islamic faith. The U.S. should also, however, not assume that the message 
of the violent Islamist is inherently unattractive to the greater Muslim world. 
Again, looking back at the Patriot movement for guidance, Crothers and Dyer 
rightly point out that the ideology of the Patriot movement was grounded in a fair 
amount of widely accepted facts.115 While the Patriots did not fully and correctly 
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understand the elements of Christianity, the American political culture, and the 
economic foundations of the farm crisis, they certainly had a grasp of enough 
ingredients to make their message culturally relevant and plausible to a large 
cross section of America. Further, their message was convincing enough that it 
was able to justify the use and support of violent action in pursuit of ideological 
goals. The same can be said for violent Islamists today. If there were not 
generally accepted aspects of Islam embedded in the ideology of violent 
Islamists, they would never be able to achieve the level of legitimacy they do in 
the Muslim world. The purpose of the thesis is not to determine to what extent 
the ideology of the Patriot movement overlaps with Christianity and the American 
cultural-political past. Similarly, this thesis does not attempt to determine just how 
accurately violent Islamists reflect the religion of Islam. Rather, what is important 
is to point out that there is, in fact, at least some degree of overlap regarding the 
Muslim faith and the message of the violent Islamists. How much overlap exists 
has been, is now, and will continue to be a topic of passionate debate. The 
answer this thesis gives to the question of how much overlap exists between the 
message of violent Islamist and mainstream Islam is simply: enough. Therefore, 
strategies designed to combat violent Islamists reconcile with this fact to 
understand fully how the message of the violent Islamists resonates in the 
Muslim world to encourage people to engage in or support the violent jihad. 
This approach attempts to separate adherence to an ideology from 
members of a cultural group. Consider WWII. Not all Germans subscribed to the 
Nazi version of National Socialism. For example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (and the 
Confessing Church) categorically rejected the ideology of Nazism and held fast 
to their adherence of Christianity, eventually at the cost of his life. A distinction 
between Germans, like Bonhoeffer and those like him, and Nazis is possible and 
should be pursued. However, should a mass movement like that of the Nazis be 
repeated, the U.S. should confront such an enemy with the same vigor as that 
presented to the Nazis.  
 57
It remains for the Muslim peoples to determine the nature of their religion, 
and it is unwise for those in the West to ascribe ignorantly attributes to the 
Islamic faith. Rather, Western observers should be diligent in assessing the facts 
as they present themselves and developing policy in accordance with those 
facts, not in accordance with cultural assumptions or wishful thinking. 
Unfortunately, up to this point, U.S. leaders have opted to make broad 
statements regarding the nature of Islam irrespective of facts, erroneously hoping 
to show that they either truly understand Islam, or that they hope determine what 
Islam really is.  
A recent statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
exemplifies this long and troubling trend. Admiral Mullen indicated that a key 
strategy for battling violent Islamists is teaching people to read as education is 
empowering, and it would enable Muslims to “understand the Quran for what it is 
and not merely what [their] mullah tells [them] it is, who is equally 
uneducated.”116 Similarly, Admiral Mullen indicated that through education a 
Muslim could “raise his children to a higher standard of living than the one he 
knew, an aspiration shared by parents around the world.” In this statement, we 
see the fallacies that continue to plague the U.S. approach to combating 
terrorism. Admiral Mullen’s statements assume that whatever the Koran says, it 
will be universally interpreted as peaceful. His statements assume that, if only 
people had the means to pursue material gain, they would be peaceful. His 
statements assume that ideology can be combated by a presentation of “the 
facts.” All of these assumptions are completely false. 
It is significant that these statements are coming from the senior military 
officer in the U.S. military. His words set policy. As such, his words should put to 
rest any remaining doubt that the U.S.’s strategy toward combating violent 
Islamists remains seriously flawed and rests on assumptions that are dubious at 
best. 
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